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a b s t r a c t 
We analyse the causal effect of job loss on disability insurance enrolment on a five-year horizon and the implica- 
tions on health expenditure. Using administrative panel data from Hungary, we follow individuals displaced due 
to a mass lay-off and compare their labour force status to non-laid-off individuals with similar employment and 
health history. According to our estimates, being laid off increases the transition probability to disability 1.5-fold 
(or by 1.4% points) in four years, and half of the excess transitions occur within the first year. The four-year 
mortality rate increases 1.7-fold (or by 0.4% point). 
Total outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical expenditure increase threefold when a laid-off individual takes up 
disability benefit, and decrease slightly afterwards, but do not reach the pre-disability levels. The medium term 
increase in health expenditure corresponds to 20 − 25% of the additional disability payments. Detailed medication 
data show that physical health shocks, the diagnosis of chronic physical conditions, such as hypertension or 
diabetes, and the deterioration of mental health all contribute to the observed surge in health expenditure. 
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(. Introduction and related literature 
The aims of this paper are twofold: to estimate the extent to which
ob displacement increases participation in social programmes for the
isabled, and the implications on health expenditure. 
The high share of working-age individuals receiving disability ben-
fits is a major social and economic problem in many developed coun-
ries. Liebman (2015) documents a substantial increase in the share
f disability insurance recipients within the working-age population in
he United States, rising from 2.2% in the late 1970s to 4.6% in 2013.
anks et al. (2015) report for Great Britain that the number of disabil-
ty recipients more than doubled from the 1970s to 2013. According to
ECD statistics, 5.6% of the working age population in OECD countries
eceived disability benefits in 2007 (the middle of our examined period),
ith much higher than average rates in Hungary (12%), Sweden, Nor-
ay, Finland and the Netherlands ( 8 − 11 %) ( OECD, 2009 , Figure 4.1).
o make the problem more severe, very few recipients of disability ben-
fits return to the labour market. 
Consequences on government expenditures are substantial. Accord-
ng to Eurostat (2019) , spending on disability benefits amounted to
.9% of GDP in the European Union (EU27) in 2007. In most OECD
ountries these expenditures are much larger than expenditures on
ny other income-replacement programme for working-age individu-
ls ( OECD, 2009 ). It is, thus, of great policy importance to understand
nd potentially reduce the employment-related channels of disability∗ Corresponding author. 
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 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) laims. Such reductions can not only increase the employment rate of
he working-age population, but can also have beneficial effects on the
ublic healthcare budget – a previously undocumented aspect, which is
he focus of our analysis. 
We know from previous literature that job loss has a lasting negative
ffect on future labour market position ( Böheim and Taylor, 2002; Elia-
on and Storrie, 2006 ) and a particularly scarring effect on consecutive
arnings ( Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes, 2001; Jacobson et al.,
993; Ruhm, 1991 ; among many others). Also, disability insurance re-
ipiency has a substantial work disincentive effect on the beneficiaries
e.g. Chen and Klaauw, 2008; French and Song, 2014; Maestas et al.,
013 ). However, less is known about the effect of job loss on the uptake
f social security benefits. 
If eligible, a displaced worker can claim unemployment benefits.
owever, once the benefit period expires, the individual either has to
eturn to work or needs to secure other social security benefits so as
o receive some income and maintain social insurance status. It has
een shown that unemployment benefits and disability benefits are to
ome extent substitutes ( Koning and Vuuren, 2007; Koning and Vuuren,
010 for the Netherlands; Bratsberg et al., 2013 for Norway), although
iphahn (1997) (using data from Germany) rejects this hypothesis. 
The availability of disability benefits is likely to affect labour force
tatus after a job loss. Indeed, as Autor and Duggan (2003) point
ut, the characteristics of the disability insurance system influence the
ropensity of labour force exit for workers who faced adverse shocks.ek). 
ay 2020 
ticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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1 The evaluation process is regulated in detail by Decree 7/2012. (II. 14.) 
of the Hungarian Ministry of National Resources. During our analysis period 
(2003–2011), there did not exist a similar detailed regulation. he more generous the disability benefit is, the more likely it is for
orkers to exit the labour market. Similarly, Rege et al. (2009) and
ratsberg et al. (2013) show for Norway that job loss significantly
ncreases the risk of disability benefit uptake. Looking at the pe-
iod of the Great Recession, both Maestas et al. (2015) and Jiménez-
artín et al. (2018) find that the recession had an increasing effect
n disability applications, but due to the increased rate of denials,
here is no clear effect on the stock of disability benefit recipients.
charle (2008) shows on county-level data from Hungary that local
abour market conditions are correlated with disability insurance claims.
In the first part of this paper, we contribute to this literature by es-
imating the causal effect of job loss on disability insurance enrolment
nd analysing the time-varying patterns of the transition rates based on
ndividual-level administrative data from Hungary between 2003 and
011. To overcome the endogeneity of job loss, we exploit mass lay-offs
nd match laid-off to non-laid-off workers with propensity score match-
ng. We then follow individuals in the matched sample and obtain that
ob loss implies a 1.5-fold (or by 1.4% points) higher transition to dis-
bility insurance in four years. Half of the excess transitions occur within
he first year, and the transition probability returns to the value in the
ontrol group after about three years. 
The increased uptake of disability benefits after a job loss may be
 moral hazard issue. As evidence for this, Gruber and Kubik (1997) ,
uggan and Gruber (2014) show that disability insurance plan char-
cteristics and denial rates have stronger effects on the labour supply
f the healthier, more able individuals; Campolieti (2002) shows that
he generosity of the disability benefit system affects the prevalence of
ard-to-diagnose conditions among the recipients. On the other hand,
he increased transition to disability may also stem from genuine health
hocks associated with unemployment. Indeed, we find that the four-
ear mortality rate increases 1.7-fold (or by 0.4% point) as a result of
he lay-off, suggesting the presence of genuine health shocks. 
Disentangling the moral hazard and the health shock channels is not
traightforward, even if data on healthcare use or health expenditure is
vailable, because non-employment may affect the demand for health
ervices through various pathways. First, unemployment and inactivity
ay have direct health effects, although the literature on it is mixed (see
.g. Browning et al., 2006 and Schmitz, 2011 for non-significant results;
challer and Stevens, 2015 for negative average effects and Schiele and
chmitz, 2016 for negative effects on those in initial bad health). Second,
ven if health status is constant, non-employment may reduce health-
are use because of the decreased incentives for health maintenance and
ossibly because of a change in insurance status. Kuhn et al. (2009) and
challer and Stevens (2015) find little evidence for an overall effect of
ob loss on healthcare use, although the latter paper shows that doc-
oral visits and prescription drug usage decrease if the lost job was the
rimary source of insurance. 
Specifically, the application for and maintenance of disability benefit
ay have profound, time-varying impact on healthcare use. At the time
f the application, healthcare use may increase because of the expanded
ncentives for being diagnosed with various chronic conditions, and also
ecause of the need to check health status during the review process.
fterwards, receiving disability benefit may reduce incentives for health
aintenance, thus lowering healthcare use. 
In the second part of our paper, we examine these channels, i.e. we
nalyse the relationship between health expenditure – an indicator of
ealthcare use – and the uptake of disability benefit. Our focus is on
he health spending of individuals who claim disability benefit after a
ob loss. Such an investigation is novel in the literature. One would ex-
ect that becoming a disability beneficiary is associated with increased
ealth spending both due to poor health (i.e. disability) and to the appli-
ation process, although little is known about the magnitudes of health
pending around disability uptake. 
According to our results, claiming disability benefit after being laid
ff is associated with a fivefold surge in inpatient and a 2.5-fold surge
n outpatient and pharmaceutical expenditure. Although the expendi-ure declines after the uptake of the benefit, it does not reach its pre-
isability level. More detailed data on medication categories show that,
eyond physical health shocks, the diagnosis of chronic physical condi-
ions, such as hypertension or diabetes, and the deterioration of mental
ealth all contribute to the observed surge in health expenditure. Thus,
he increase in disability insurance enrolment after a job loss is neither
urely a moral hazard issue nor exclusively a consequence of genuine
ealth shocks. These results extend and partly contradict the findings of
ege et al. (2009) , who identify the mental health effect of job loss as
he key driver of the increase in disability benefit uptake. 
. Institutional background 
.1. Disability, unemployment benefit and old-age pension 
The following brief summary of the disability insurance system in
ungary is based on MISSOC (2018) , OECD (2012) and Scharle (2011) .
Disability insurance in its current form was introduced in 1983. As
art of the social security system, disability benefits are paid from the
ublic budget. During the first part of the analysed period (up to 2008),
eople with at least 67% incapacity for work could apply for disability
ension. The amount of the benefit was influenced by the average wage
efore disability, the incapacity ratio and the length of the insurance pe-
iod. The replacement rate typically varied between 40 − 65 %. Eligibility
erminated if the pensioner was no longer incapable of work, or worked
n a regular basis, earning an income comparable to what could have
een earned in the specific occupation prior to becoming disabled. Dis-
bility pension recipiency could start immediately after the termination
f employment, without a compulsory waiting period. The evaluation
f claims was rather generous. However, as public spending on disabil-
ty benefits steadily increased, governments began to acknowledge the
eed for reform. As a result, rehabilitation allowance was introduced in
008. It is paid to a person with a required number of service years who
uffers from 50 − 79 % damage to health (comparable to the 67% inca-
acity for work in the previous system), is unable to pursue a former job
ut is capable of rehabilitation. It is 20% more generous than disability
ension but may be paid only for the necessary period of rehabilitation
nd for a maximum of three years. Recipients of the allowance have to
articipate in a comprehensive rehabilitation plan devised by the em-
loyment office with a view to recover their work capacity. Those who
uffer from at least 50% damage to health, but for whom rehabilitation
s not proposed, can apply for disability pension. 
Our data does not allow to distinguish between these types of ben-
fits, so we will examine them jointly under the name ‘disability ben-
fit’. According to ONYF (2012) , while the average monthly amounts
f rehabilitation allowance and disability pension were similar in 2011
around 73,000 HUF ≈ 233 EUR), there were 305 thousand disability
ension recipients and only 25 thousand rehabilitation allowance re-
ipients, out of the total population of around 10 million in Hungary.
ven between 2008 − 2011 , when the two schemes existed simultane-
usly, there were 2.5-fold more new disability pensioners than new re-
abilitation allowance recipients. 
An application for disability benefit is evaluated by a committee,
hich considers the social circumstances of the applicant as well as the
edical evidence for disability. Social circumstances, such as access to
ublic transportation, caring responsibilities, characteristics of the so-
ial network all influence whether rehabilitation is recommended. 1 The
edical evidence is provided by the general practitioner (GP), based on
ertificates and discharge notes issued by specialists, and possibly by
ospitals. Thus, the process requires the involvement of both primary
are and secondary care physicians. The committee then evaluates the
A. Bíró and P. Elek Labour Economics 65 (2020) 101856 
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2 The linked dataset is under the ownership of the Central Administration of 
National Pension Insurance, the National Health Insurance Fund Administration 
(NHIFA), the Educational Authority, the National Tax and Customs Administra- 
tion, the National Labour Office, and the Pension Payment Directorate of Hun- 
gary. The data was processed by the Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic 
and Regional Studies (CERS). ate of incapacity for work based on the medical evidence. A similar pro-
ess exists for the review of eligibility, which occurs every 1 − 5 years
depending on the condition of the applicant). This implies that the ap-
lication for and review of disability both increase health expenditure.
n the analysed period, the approval rate of disability insurance appli-
ations was around 30% ( ONYF, 2012 ). 
The system of disability insurance was again reformed in 2011,
ostly due to the high public payments on disability benefits and to
he alleged widespread abuse of the system. The new, stricter legisla-
ion came into effect in 2012, which is outside our observation period.
ince then, disability benefits are no longer considered to be part of the
ension system, but rather as a type of sickness allowance. 
A major risk of the system is that, despite the screening of appli-
ants for disability benefits, individuals might still use them as a sub-
titute of unemployment benefits. Over the analysed period (between
003 − 2011 ), Hungary had a two-tier unemployment insurance scheme.
nemployment benefit in the first tier depended on the income the year
efore unemployment, and could be received for, at most, 270 days.
fter the exhaustion of the first tier of unemployment benefits, the un-
mployed could receive a flat amount of unemployment assistance for
n additional 3 months. Afterwards, low-income individuals could claim
elfare benefits. 
Upon reaching old-age retirement age, disability benefits are re-
laced by old-age pension. Hungary has a mandatory, pay-as-you go
ension system, where pensions are based on earnings before retire-
ent, and eligibility is conditional on 20 years of service. In the anal-
sed period, the majority of individuals retired at the statutory early
etirement age, which was 60 years for men and increased from 57 to
9 years for women. (For more details on the pension system, see Bíró
nd Elek, 2018 .) 
.2. Healthcare system 
The Hungarian healthcare system is a single-payer system, where
ervices are financed from contributions and state subsidies, adminis-
ered by the National Health Insurance Fund Administration (NHIFA).
he vast majority of individuals – the employees, the unemployed, the
ensioners and those on various benefits – are automatically insured (in
he case of employees, the employers are obliged to pay the social insur-
nce contributions for them). So as to remain insured, inactive people
ot belonging to any of the previous categories have to pay a monthly
ee for health insurance coverage, however, those with low income are
till exempt from the payment of the fee. Thus, in practice, job loss and
ubsequent labour market transitions have no effect on health insurance
tatus. 
The majority of healthcare services, including both outpatient and
npatient care, do not require co-payments, although informal payments
re common for a wide range of services ( Gaál et al., 2006; Szende and
ulyer, 2006 ). This implies for our study that any observed increase in
ealth expenditure might be coupled with an unobserved increase in
ut-of-pocket informal payments. Also, people willing to provide infor-
al payments might be able to collect the medical evidence for disability
enefit application faster or can secure more favourable medical evalu-
tions. People may opt for using private care (which was common only
n certain specialties; e.g. in dental care or gynecology, during the ex-
mined period) when they have to pay fee for the services. User fees
or medication depend on the amount of subsidies from the NHIFA,
hich varies greatly across substances. On average, patients have to
over slightly less than half of the price of a medication: the rest is paid
y the social security. A more detailed overview of Hungary’s healthcare
ystem is provided by Gaál et al. (2011) . 
. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on a unique administrative panel
ataset from Hungary. The data cover a random half of the 5 − 74 years-ld population in 2003, who were followed until 2011. It was created
y linking administrative data from the Hungarian tax authority, the
ension and the health authorities, among others. 2 In this research, we
oncentrate on the 35 − 54 years old age group, which includes most of
he transitions to disability, but excludes the vast majority of old-age
ensioners. By cutting the sample at age 54, we focus on individuals
f active age and exclude the analysis of the choice between disability
enefit and old-age pension. 
We use various segments of the dataset. Gender, year of birth and set-
lement of residence (corresponding to year 2003) are recorded for each
ndividual. The labour market and benefit segment contains monthly
nformation on wages, employment, pension and other benefit status.
herefore, we can track on a monthly basis whether an individual was
mployed, was a pensioner or received unemployment, disability or
ther benefits. Occupation (ISCO) codes of employment spells are col-
ected for employees. Level of education is not observed but can be ap-
roximated for each occupation code (and thus for each individual) as
he median education level of workers with the same occupation in the
abour Force Survey. 
Based on our dataset, employees of the same firm can be identified.
he sector of the employer (public or private) is also observed. The size
f the firm can be approximated as twice the number of its employees in
he sample, although this estimate is not very accurate for micro-firms.
Fig. 1 shows the rates of the most important benefits by gender and
ge. The employment rate (not shown in the figure) is 60 − 70 % for
ales of the examined ages. The ratio of disability benefit recipients
ncreases heavily with age and goes above 10% among those aged 50
nd above, while unemployment benefit is received by around 5% of
he population at all examined ages. The ratio of old-age pensioners
not shown) is below 3%, even among those aged 50 − 54 . 
In the main analysis, we will follow the labour market outcomes of
orkers who were laid off during a mass lay-off, which we consider as
n involuntary job loss. An event is classified as a mass lay-off if the size
f the company decreases by at least 30% in a given month, remains be-
ow 70% of the original size throughout the following year, and no more
han 15% of its employees move to the same employer. Various defini-
ions of mass lay-off have been advocated in the literature, with 30% as a
idely used cut-off (see Handwerker and Mason, 2012 for an overview,
nd Jacobson et al., 1993; Sullivan and Wachter, 2009 for specific ex-
mples). Our mass lay-off definition includes company closures as well.
ince the size of micro-firms cannot be determined precisely in our 50%
ample, we examine only the mass lay-offs of companies with at least
ve employees in the dataset (i.e. at least ten employees on average). 
In Appendix C , we check the robustness of our results to the use
f 20% and 40% dismissal rates in the definition of mass lay-off, and to
wo alternative definitions of job loss – company closure (including early
eavers) and the official definition of collective redundancy in Hungary.
he main results are qualitatively robust to these alternative definitions.
We make the following sample restrictions. We focus on individu-
ls aged 35 − 54 years, who were continuously employed in the last six
onths by a firm with at least ten (estimated) employees, and did not
eceive unemployment, disability or maternity benefits in the last month
f employment. We concentrate on years between 2005 − 2009 to ensure
hat we have a two-year long history and also a two-year long follow-
p period for each individual. Altogether we examine 28,169 laid-off
orkers, out of the approximately 1 million workers aged 35 − 54 years.
escriptive statistics are provided in Table 1 . 
Health expenditure is observed on the annual level in the dataset.
e have information on the annual public spending on specialist out-
A. Bíró and P. Elek Labour Economics 65 (2020) 101856 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the employed, the matched mass lay-off and matched control sample. 
Employed 
Mass lay-off Control 
Standardized 
difference 
(matched) (matched) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (matched) 
Year 
2005 0.202 0.402 0.173 0.378 0.173 0.378 0.0% 
2006 0.201 0.401 0.161 0.367 0.161 0.367 0.0% 
2007 0.202 0.402 0.152 0.359 0.152 0.359 0.0% 
2008 0.201 0.401 0.253 0.435 0.253 0.435 0.0% 
2009 0.193 0.395 0.261 0.439 0.261 0.439 0.0% 
Male 0.464 0.499 0.538 0.499 0.538 0.499 0.0% 
Age group 
35–39 0.247 0.431 0.257 0.437 0.261 0.439 -0.9% 
40–44 0.232 0.422 0.231 0.422 0.229 0.420 0.5% 
45–49 0.244 0.429 0.237 0.425 0.236 0.425 0.2% 
50–54 0.277 0.448 0.275 0.446 0.274 0.446 0.2% 
Region (2003) 
C Hungary 0.289 0.453 0.285 0.452 0.284 0.451 0.3% 
C Transdanubia 0.127 0.332 0.130 0.337 0.128 0.334 0.7% 
W Transdanubia 0.116 0.32 0.111 0.314 0.109 0.312 0.5% 
S Transdanubia 0.091 0.287 0.083 0.277 0.083 0.276 0.1% 
N Hungary 0.118 0.322 0.138 0.345 0.141 0.348 -0.8% 
N Great Plain 0.137 0.343 0.141 0.348 0.146 0.353 -1.3% 
S Great Plain 0.123 0.328 0.111 0.314 0.108 0.311 0.7% 
Settlement type (2003) 
Budapest 0.164 0.37 0.153 0.360 0.152 0.359 0.4% 
County-level town 0.217 0.412 0.187 0.390 0.188 0.391 -0.2% 
Other town 0.321 0.467 0.326 0.469 0.326 0.469 -0.1% 
Village 0.298 0.457 0.334 0.472 0.334 0.472 0.0% 
Estimated level of education (based on occupation) 
Primary 0.140 0.347 0.207 0.405 0.206 0.405 0.2% 
Lower secondary 0.377 0.485 0.544 0.498 0.543 0.498 0.2% 
Upper secondary 0.276 0.447 0.172 0.378 0.173 0.378 -0.2% 
Tertiary 0.207 0.405 0.077 0.267 0.078 0.268 -0.4% 
Firm characteristics 
Size 4811 8970 209 554 182 522 5.0% 
10–24 employees 0.121 0.326 0.214 0.410 0.229 0.420 -3.7% 
25–49 employees 0.079 0.269 0.183 0.387 0.196 0.397 -3.2% 
50–99 employees 0.089 0.284 0.181 0.385 0.190 0.392 -2.3% 
100–249 employees 0.113 0.316 0.172 0.378 0.170 0.376 0.6% 
250–4999 employees 0.308 0.462 0.214 0.410 0.187 0.390 6.8% 
5000- employees 0.292 0.455 0.036 0.185 0.028 0.165 4.4% 
Size 1 year ago if non-missing 3831 7632 220 576 181 565 6.9% 
Size 2 years ago if non-missing 3038 6454 167 479 141 516 5.2% 
Size 1 year ago non-missing 0.852 0.355 0.795 0.404 0.791 0.406 1.0% 
Size 2 years ago non-missing 0.727 0.445 0.595 0.491 0.572 0.495 4.6% 
Government sector 0.292 0.455 0.030 0.172 0.027 0.161 2.3% 
Labour market history, number of months 
Employment in prev. 12 months 11.87 0.71 11.59 1.21 11.58 1.24 0.6% 
Employment in prev. 13–24 months 11.36 2.21 10.31 3.50 10.18 3.66 3.7% 
Disability benefit in prev. 12 months 0.003 0.14 0.007 0.22 0.005 0.20 0.6% 
Disability benefit in prev. 13–24 months 0.010 0.32 0.021 0.45 0.022 0.46 -0.2% 
Unemployment in prev. 12 months 0.066 0.55 0.20 0.93 0.19 0.93 1.0% 
Unemployment in prev. 13–24 months 0.20 1.20 0.55 1.91 0.55 1.92 -0.4% 
Maternity in prev. 12 months 0.026 0.42 0.028 0.45 0.037 0.51 -1.9% 
Maternity in prev. 13–24 months 0.099 0.98 0.11 1.07 0.14 1.19 -2.6% 
Total wage in prev. 13–24 months, M HUF 2.05 4.15 1.30 1.60 1.27 1.48 1.8% 
Health expenditure history, gender- and age-corrected percentiles 
Outpatient, 1 year ago 47.5 30.1 45.1 31.5 45.2 31.0 -0.4% 
Outpatient, 2 years ago 47.5 30.0 45.0 31.2 45.0 30.8 0.1% 
Inpatient, 1 year ago 9.6 26.7 9.9 27.1 10.2 27.5 -1.3% 
Inpatient, 2 years ago 9.6 26.7 9.6 26.7 9.8 27.0 -0.8% 
Pharma, 1 year ago 46.7 31.2 43.6 32.2 43.2 32.0 1.2% 
Pharma, 2 years ago 46.6 31.3 43.5 32.2 43.1 32.0 1.1% 
Days of sick-leave in prev. 13–24 months 3.9 17.0 4.8 19.6 5.3 21.8 -2.3% 
Number of observations ∗ 28,169 28,169 
∗ : No. of individuals: 1,074,888. No. of person-months: 38 . 4 − 38 . 9 million, depending on the variable. See text 
for sample restrictions. S.D.: standard deviation. Standardized difference: the difference of means divided by the 
square root of the average of the two individual variances. 
A. Bíró and P. Elek Labour Economics 65 (2020) 101856 
Fig. 1. Rates of some benefits by gender and age group. 
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u  atient care and inpatient care, and on the annual public plus private
out-of-pocket, OOP) expenditure on prescribed pharmaceuticals. Alto-
ether, we track around 60% of total healthcare expenditure (based on
he expenditure categories of Gaál et al., 2011 ). The most important ex-
luded items are services provided by GPs, and OOP payments on non-
rescribed medications and on medical services. Although GP care is
ot covered by our data, total outpatient care expenditure is reasonably
ell captured because of the high usage of outpatient specialist care in
ungary (see Elek et al., 2015 ). According to Gaál et al. (2011) , public
xpenditure on outpatient specialist care is almost twice as much as on
rimary care, and made up around 17% of spending on curative services
nd around 10% of total public healthcare expenditure in the examined
eriod. In 2009, the per capita annual number of outpatient specialist
ontacts was 12.0 in Hungary, the third highest in Central- and South-
astern-Europe, and higher than in any Western-European country. In
ny case, since contacts with primary care physicians are needed for
eferrals to specialist care and for the provision of medical certificates
or disability, it is unlikely that an observed disability-related increase
f specialist care use would be coupled with a reduced use of primary
are. 
In addition to outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical expenditure,
ore detailed medication data that provide pharmaceutical spending on
he 3rd level ATC (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical) groups are also
vailable for years 2009 − 2011 for 42% of the individuals in the sample. 3 3 This medication dataset originates from NHIFA, and was processed by CERS. 
he sample is a 50% random sample of the Hungarian population, but it was 
rawn independently from the baseline sample used elsewhere in our analysis. 
ince the baseline and the medication data do not have the same (anonymised) 
dentifiers, we conduct a probabilistic matching between the two datasets. First, 
e create gender – monthly date of birth – district of residence cells in both 
atasets, with an average cell size of about 26 people. Second, for each individ- 
al in the baseline sample, we search for a pair in the medication sample who 
elongs to the same cell, and whose outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical 
xpenditures are the most similar to those in the baseline dataset. (These expen- 
iture items are observed in both datasets for 2009 − 2011 , albeit with measure- 
ent error, so there are 9 matching variables.) Similarity is defined by maximis- 
ng the number of equal expenditure items out of the non-zero items during the 
hree years; if more than one pair is found then the sum of the absolute differ- 
nces of the corresponding (non-equal) expenditure items is minimised; finally, 
ne candidate is randomly picked in case of a draw. The matching is regarded 
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ior these people, we will examine specifically the expenditure on eight
ain 1st level ATC groups that altogether make up more than 90% of
harmaceutical spending, and also drug categories on the 3rd ATC level
or four major diseases (antidepressants, lipid modifying agents, antihy-
ertensives and antidiabetics). 4 
. Methods 
.1. Treatment – control comparisons 
We examine the medium-term effect of involuntary job loss on taking
p disability benefit and on other outcomes. We compare e.g. disability
nsurance enrolment of laid-off workers to those non-laid-off workers
ho were similar in their measured characteristics at the time of lay-
ff. Similarity is defined in terms of the variables of Table 1 , which
nclude calendar time, individual demographic characteristics (gender,
ge, region, settlement type), characteristics of the current job (firm
ize, occupation 5 ), history of labour market and benefit status in the
ast 24 months, history of health expenditure and sick leave in the last
wo calendar years (but not in the current year) and the change of the
ize of the employee’s firm in the last two years. 
Since we do not observe health status directly, we can only
se lagged health expenditure as a proxy for health. Bíró and
lek (2018) show using the same data that health expenditure, in par-
icular pharmaceutical expenditure, is a strong predictor of mortality as
ar as six years ahead, thus likely captures health status reasonably well.
We include the one- and two-year lagged indicators of health spend-
ng and sick leave among the similarity variables. In principle, if the
ass lay-off was preceded by worsening work environment then the
agged health indicators could already be affected. This would imply
hat our estimated effect of mass lay-off on disability insurance enrol-
ent is a lower bound of the true effect. On the other hand, the de-ppropriate if the number of equal, non-zero expenditure items is larger than 
alf of the number of non-zero expenditure items of a person in the baseline 
ample. Using this procedure, we find a pair for 42% of the baseline sample, 
hich is close to the theoretical maximum (50%). 
4 See the footnote of Table 5 or Fig. 5 for the precise definitions. 
5 A detailed occupational (ISCO-based) classification with 34 items, not shown 
n the Table, is used. 
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i  criptive statistics of Table 1 suggest that the average health spending
istory of the laid-off individuals is similar to that of the whole sample
f workers, thus there is no direct evidence that a mass lay-off would be
receded by increased health expenditure. In any case, our strategy of
ocusing on mass lay-offs helps to ensure the similarity of laid-off and
on-laid-off individuals in terms of health status because mass lay-offs
re less health-dependent than ordinary lay-offs. 
We perform 1:1 nearest neighbour propensity score matching, ap-
lying a logit model with the above similarity variables. 6 Following, for
xample, Austin (2011) , a caliper of 0.2 standard deviation of the logit
core is enforced to exclude matches that are far from a laid-off worker
n treatment propensity. 7 Exact matching is conducted on gender and
onthly date, and matching is performed without replacement on the
ndividual basis. That is, if a person belongs to the treated group or is
hosen as a control observation, then she/he cannot be in the control
roup at another date. However, the control group may contain indi-
iduals whose firms are affected by mass lay-off but themselves are not
aid off. 
The last column of Table 1 shows that the laid-off and the matched
ontrol sample are sufficiently similar to each other with respect to
he examined variables, the standardized differences 8 being below 7%
0.07) in all cases, less than the 0.10 difference treated as an appropriate
alance in propensity score studies (e.g. Austin, 2009 ). Fig. A1 in the Ap-
endix also confirms that the estimated propensity scores are balanced
n the treatment (laid-off) and the matched control group. 
After finding a suitable control group, we show graphically how the
atio of disability benefit recipients, the three-month transition proba-
ility to disability as well as other labour market outcomes evolve in the
atched laid-off vs. control samples. Beyond a graphical analysis, we es-
imate simple linear probability and logit models of some outcomes at
 = 24 and 𝑡 = 48 months on the joint sample of the laid-off (treatment)
nd control observations, with the treatment dummy as the explana-
ory variable. Here 𝑡 = 0 denotes the time of inclusion into the matched
ample (which is the time of lay-off in the treatment group). Following
badie and Spiess (2019) , in the regression models we estimate standard
rrors by clustering at the level of matched pairs. This method provides
onsistent standard error estimates if matching is done without replace-
ent, which holds in our case. 
In the regression models we concentrate on three outcome variables.
irst, the probabilities of being disabled at 𝑡 = 24 and at 𝑡 = 48 months
re analysed. Second, to investigate whether genuine health shocks are
resent, we look at the two- and four-year mortality rates. Third, based
n the medication data on ATC categories, we compare the rates of peo-
le in the matched laid-off vs. control sample at 𝑡 = 24 and 𝑡 = 48 months
ho are disability insurance recipients and at the same time use specific
rug categories (i.e. we examine joint probabilities). This approach fol-
ows Rege et al. (2009) and provides insight into the types of diseases
hat lead to disability insurance uptake. A larger joint probability in the
reatment vs. the control group indicates that the additional disability
ensioners due to job loss consume the particular medication category.
f, on the other hand, the rates in the treatment and control group are
imilar, that suggests no (or small) consumption of the medication cat-
gory among the additional disability recipients. 
Also, to measure heterogeneous lay-off effects, we estimate linear
robability models of the probability of being disabled at two and four6 Using more than one nearest neighbour would decrease the variance of the 
stimates at the cost of increased bias ( Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and 
ahba, 2002 ). However, since we have a large sample, even the 1:1 matching 
ields reasonably precise estimates. 
7 This adjustment affects only 4% of the treated sample; hence Table 1 does 
ot display descriptive statistics separately on the laid-off and the matched laid- 
ff sample. 
8 The standardized difference is obtained by dividing the mean difference with 
he standard deviation of the variables. The latter is approximated as the square 
oot of the average of the two individual variances. 
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lears, respectively, where the lay-off dummy is interacted with individ-
al characteristics such as gender, level of education, age group, region
pecific unemployment rate (measured at 𝑡 = 0 ) and – to capture base-
ine health status – the dummy for hospitalization in the last year before
 = 0 . 
.2. Event study analyses 
We investigate, with event study analyses, the time pattern of health
xpenditure of displaced workers who became disabled some time after
he job loss. We regress, in a fixed-effects setting, the annual health
xpenditure measures on the years elapsed since (or before) the uptake
f disability benefit within the sample of laid-off individuals receiving
isability benefit: 
 𝑖𝑠 = 𝜂0 + 
∑
𝑘 ≠0 
𝜂𝑘 𝐷 
( 𝑘 ) 
𝑖𝑠 
+ 𝑐 𝑖 + 𝜉𝑠 + 𝑢 𝑖𝑠 , (1)
here i denotes the individual, s the calendar time in years, h is is an
ndicator of health expenditure, 𝐷 ( 𝑘 ) 
𝑖𝑠 
(−2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 2) is the time (in years)
fter or before the uptake of disability benefit, 𝜉s is the calendar year
xed effect, c i captures individual fixed effects (controlling for all time-
nvariant individual characteristics such as gender or initial health sta-
us) and u is denotes the error term. The parameters 𝜂k are of main inter-
st. 
We use various health expenditure indicators as outcome variables.
irst, we simply analyse the values of the three expenditure categories
outpatient, inpatient and prescribed pharmaceutical expenditure). Sec-
nd, due to the non-negligible fraction of zero expenditure (i.e. of not
sing the given category of healthcare at all in a given year) and to the
igh skewness of the expenditure distributions, we analyse the proba-
ility of positive (non-zero) health expenditure and the logarithm of the
ositive expenditure separately, in a two-part (hurdle) model setting,
or the three expenditure items. The hurdle model allows an explicit
istinction between the extensive margin (zero versus non-zero expen-
iture) and the intensive margin (amount of expenditure if non-zero), as
idely used in health economics (see Deb and Norton, 2018; Pohlmeier
nd Ulrich, 1995 , among many others). Finally, we estimate Eq. (1) with
harmaceutical purchases by medication (ATC) categories as outcome
ariables. 
. Results 
.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the general employed pop-
lation, of workers displaced in mass lay-offs, and of workers in the
atched control sample. 
According to Table 1 , mass lay-offs peaked during the financial crisis
n 2008–2009, and affected males, the lower educated and the employ-
es of smaller firms disproportionately more often. Furthermore, laid-off
orkers earned one third less and spent one month less in employment,
.3 month more in unemployment and 0.9 day more on sick leave in the
3–24 months preceding their displacement than the general employed
opulation. On the other hand, the two-year health expenditure history
s not particularly different in the laid-off and in the general working
opulation, as measured by outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical
xpenditure percentiles. The percentiles were calculated according to
he (five-year) age group- and gender-specific expenditure distributions
covering both workers and non-workers). 9 
Fig. 2 displays the time pattern of some labour force indicators of
he matched laid-off vs. control workers (disability benefit recipiency is
lotted on Fig. 3 ). The pre-trends of the two groups are identical, apart
rom the severance pay effect observed in monthly wages of laid-off9 The average inpatient percentile is around 10 for both groups because of the 
ow rate of hospitalisation. 
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Fig. 2. Labour force indicators around the time of mass lay-off. 
Fig. 3. Disability benefit recipiency rates 
and three-month transition probabilities in 
the mass lay-off and control groups as well 
as the treatment – control differences (with 
95% confidence intervals). 
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10 The sample size is smaller than reported in Table 1 even for the two-year 
horizon model because future disability benefit status is missing in some cases 
due to e.g. moving abroad or death. orkers just before the lay-off. The employment rate falls substantially
t the time of mass lay-off and partly reverts afterwards, while the un-
mployment rate shows the opposite pattern. Meanwhile, the stock of
isability benefit recipients increases much faster after the job loss than
n the control group ( Fig. 3 ). 
.2. Disability benefits 
The top right plot in Fig. 3 shows that the difference between the
isability benefit recipiency rate in the mass lay-off and control groups
ncreases for more than four years in the observation period. Table 2
isplays the probability of receiving disability benefit specifically at 𝑡 =
4 and 𝑡 = 48 months. The ratio of disability benefit recipients is 2.3%n the laid-off and 1.2% in the control group after two years, hence
he difference is 1.1% points, which increases to 1.4% points after four
ears. In line with these figures, a simple logit model, containing only
he lay-off dummy gives an odds ratio of 1.97 after two years and 1.49
fter four years. 10 The average marginal effects from the logit models
not shown here) are almost identical to the linear estimates. 
For the sake of comparison, we show in Table B1 in the Appendix
hat mass lay-off decreases the probability of employment by 13 − 17 %
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Table 2 
Effect of mass lay-off on the probability of receiving disability benefit two and four 
years later. 
Probability of receiving disability benefit 
at 2 years at 4 years 
in (matched) control group 0.0121 0.0290 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0236 0.0426 
difference (with S.E.) 0.0114 ∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0136 ∗∗∗ (0.0023) 
Logit model odds ratios on receving disability benefit 
at 2 years at 4 years 
coeff. (OR) S.E. coeff. (OR) S.E. 
mass lay-off 1.971 ∗∗∗ (0.136) 1.492 ∗∗∗ (0.102) 
constant 0.012 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.030 ∗∗∗ (0.002) 
Number of observations 53,114 25,760 
With cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), clustering at the level of matched pairs. 
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Table 3 
Linear probability models with controls and interactions for the effects of mass lay-off
on the probability of receiving disability benefit two and four years later. 
Probability of receiving disability benefit 
at 2 years at 4 years 
coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. 
Interaction of mass lay-off with 
male 0.0017 (0.0024) 0.0061 (0.0047) 
age group (baseline = 35–39 years) 
- 40–44 year 0.0043 ∗ (0.0022) − 0.0034 (0.0046) 
- 45–49 year 0.0069 ∗∗∗ (0.0026) 0.0052 (0.0055) 
- 50–54 year 0.0180 ∗∗∗ (0.0033) 0.0288 ∗∗∗ (0.0062) 
education (baseline = primary) 
- lower secondary − 0.0030 (0.0034) 0.0012 (0.0063) 
- upper secondary 0.0054 (0.0039) 0.0198 ∗∗∗ (0.0075) 
- tertiary − 0.0023 (0.0043) 0.0110 (0.0089) 
hospitalization in year before 𝑡 = 0 0.0278 ∗∗∗ (0.0062) 0.0225 ∗∗ (0.0105) 
region specific unemployment rate − 0.0225 (0.0295) 0.0899 (0.1070) 
constant 0.0030 (0.0039) − 0.0116 (0.0090) 
Main effects (differences in probabilities in the control group) 
male 0.0012 (0.0014) − 0.0003 (0.0030) 
age group (baseline = 35–39 years) 
- 40–44 year 0.0024 ∗ (0.0012) 0.0129 ∗∗∗ (0.0031) 
- 45–49 year 0.0073 ∗∗∗ (0.0015) 0.0268 ∗∗∗ (0.0036) 
- 50–54 year 0.0199 ∗∗∗ (0.0019) 0.0390 ∗∗∗ (0.0038) 
education (baseline = primary) 
- lower secondary −0 . 0054 ∗∗∗ (0.0020) −0 . 0129 ∗∗∗ (0.0044) 
- upper secondary −0 . 0111 ∗∗∗ (0.0021) −0 . 0278 ∗∗∗ (0.0047) 
- tertiary −0 . 0105 ∗∗∗ (0.0025) −0 . 0261 ∗∗∗ (0.0057) 
hospitalization in year before 𝑡 = 0 0.0228 ∗∗∗ (0.0035) 0.0365 ∗∗∗ (0.0066) 
region specific unemployment rate 0.0841 ∗∗∗ (0.0223) 0.1773 ∗∗ (0.0691) 
year at 𝑡 = 0 (baseline = 2005) 
- 2006 −0 . 0059 ∗∗∗ (0.0022) −0 . 0057 ∗∗ (0.0029) 
- 2007 −0 . 0073 ∗∗∗ (0.0023) −0 . 0111 ∗∗∗ (0.0028) 
- 2008 −0 . 0107 ∗∗∗ (0.0020) 
- 2009 −0 . 0156 ∗∗∗ (0.0024) 
constant 0.0093 ∗∗∗ (0.0027) 0.0135 ∗∗ (0.0060) 
Number of observations 53,114 25,760 
Cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), clustering at the level of matched pairs. ∗ ∗ ∗ 
p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
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11 Compared to the stock of disability benefit recipients, the transition rate to 
the opposite direction is negligible: only around 0.6% of the recipients return oints and increases the probability of unemployment by 3 . 7 − 5 . 3 %
oints over the two- and four-year time horizons, with no significant
ffect on the receipt of maternity benefits. Job loss decreases non-zero
arnings by 16 − 17 % over these time spans, which is in line with other
esults in the literature ( Jacobson et al., 1993 and Stevens, 1997 , among
thers). 
The bottom plots of Fig. 3 show the three-month transition
robabilities to disability and the differences between the laid-off and
he control group. The transition probability jumps high in the laid-
ff group after the expiry of unemployment benefit (at 6–12 months), thile it increases slowly in the control group. The difference of transi-
ion probabilities is statistically significantly positive in the first three
ears and reaches zero afterwards. Overall, around half of the total ex-
ess transitions of four years occur within the first year. 11 
Looking at the linear probability model with heterogenous effects
n Table 3 , the interaction terms of individual characteristics with masso work and stop receiving the benefit in a given year. 
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Table 4 
Effect of mass lay-off on mortality. 
Probability of death 
within 2 years within 4 years 
in (matched) control group 0.0034 0.0049 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0056 0.0085 
difference (with S.E.) 0.0022 ∗∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0036 ∗∗∗ (0.0010) 
Logit model odds ratios of death 
within 2 years within 4 years 
coeff. (OR) S.E. coeff. (OR) S.E. 
mass lay-off 1.639 ∗∗∗ (0.213) 1.738 ∗∗∗ (0.267) 
constant 0.0034 ∗∗∗ (0.0003) 0.0050 ∗∗∗ (0.0006) 
Number of observations 56,338 27,344 
With cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), clustering at the level of matched pairs. 
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Table 5 
Effect of mass lay-off on the joint probability of disability benefit recipiency and the usage of specific medi- 
cation categories two and four years later. 
2 years later 
ATC A ATC B ATC C ATC J ATC L ATC M 
control group 0.0040 0.0024 0.0042 0.0027 0.0007 0.0035 
laid-off group 0.0087 0.0058 0.0105 0.0060 0.0007 0.0078 
difference 0.0047 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0034 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0063 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0033 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0000 0.0043 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(with S.E.) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0012) 
logit OR of lay-off 2.186 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.469 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.522 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.227 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.039 2.236 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(with S.E.) (0.472) (0.677) (0.517) (0.577) (0.600) (0.514) 
anti- lipid mod. anti- anti- 
ATC N ATC R depressants agents hypertensives diabetics 
control group 0.0038 0.0028 0.0021 0.0020 0.0040 0.0007 
laid-off group 0.0072 0.0051 0.0037 0.0057 0.0097 0.0016 
difference 0.0034 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0023 ∗ ∗ 0.0016 ∗ 0.0037 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0057 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0009 ∗ 
(with S.E.) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0006) 
logit OR of lay-off 1.883 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.926 ∗ ∗ 1.775 ∗ 2.868 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.449 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.253 ∗ 
(with S.E.) (0.423) (0.536) (0.544) (0.839) (0.519) (1.113) 
Number of observations 15,855 
4 years later 
ATC A ATC B ATC C ATC J ATC L ATC M 
control group 0.0116 0.0096 0.0166 0.0094 0.0026 0.0119 
laid-off group 0.0176 0.0142 0.0213 0.0127 0.0021 0.0164 
difference 0.0060 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0047 ∗ ∗ 0.0047 ∗ 0.0033 ∗ -0.0004 0.0044 ∗ ∗ 
(with S.E.) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0022) 
logit OR of lay-off 1.525 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.498 ∗ ∗ 1.292 ∗ 1.354 ∗ 0.824 1.375 ∗ ∗ 
(with S.E.) (0.242) (0.263) (0.178) (0.244) (0.320) (0.220) 
anti- lipid mod. anti- anti- 
ATC N ATC R depressants agents hypertensives diabetics 
control group 0.0119 0.0063 0.0055 0.0090 0.0152 0.0027 
laid-off group 0.0165 0.0109 0.0081 0.0100 0.0199 0.0035 
difference 0.0046 ∗ ∗ 0.0046 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0026 ∗ 0.0010 0.0047 ∗ 0.0008 
(with S.E.) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0010) 
logit OR of lay-off 1.390 ∗ ∗ 1.735 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.485 ∗ 1.109 1.315 ∗ 1.289 
(with S.E.) (0.222) (0.363) (0.343) (0.213) (0.189) (0.433) 
Number of observations 11,548 
Cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), clustering at the level of matched pairs 
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
ATC group definitions: A – alimentary tract and metabolism; B – blood and blood forming organs; C –
cardiovascular system; J – antiinfectives for systemic use; L – antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents; 
M –musculo-skeletal system; N – nervous system; R – respiratory system. Antidepressants (psychoanaleptics): 
N06; lipid modifying agents C10; antihypertensives: C02-C03 and C07-C09; antidiabetics: A10. 
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aay-off show that job loss increases the probability of receiving disability
enefit particularly among individuals aged 45–54 and among those in
ad health, as measured by the dummy for hospitalisation in the year
receding job loss. After adjusting for these differences, the interaction
erms with gender, education level and micro-regional unemployment
ate – a proxy for local labour market conditions – are statistically in-
ignificant. These results imply that mass lay-off might serve as an in-
entive to apply for disability benefit among older individuals and thosen worse health. Using the terminology of Inderbitzin et al. (2016) , the
tronger effect of job loss on disability benefit uptake among the older
uggests a complementarity between (early) retirement and disability
enefits, i.e. the latter might serve as an option for an early exit from
he labour force. It is also possible that job loss has a stronger health ef-
ect on those who were in worse health previously, leading to a stronger
ffect on disability enrolment. We analyse the underlying health mech-
nisms in the next subsections. 
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Fig. 4. Event study analysis of health expenditure around the uptake of disability benefit Notes: Regression estimates of Eq. (1) are plotted. Number of individuals: 
1,290; number of person-years: 5,879. 95% confidence intervals are displayed, based on cluster-robust standard errors (clustering on the individual level). The 
average expenditure on outpatient care, inpatient care and drugs at time 0 are 56, 307 and 189 thousand HUF, respectively. The average usage rates of outpatient 
care, inpatient care and drugs at time 0 are 0.985, 0.658 and 0.958, respectively. The average logarithmic values of outpatient, inpatient and drug expenditure at 
time 0 are 10.66, 12.78 and 11.26, respectively. 
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y  The lower panel of Table 3 displays the differences of the baseline,
.e. the non-laid-off, disablement probabilities by the explanatory vari-
bles. The interaction terms should be interpreted in light of the fact that
he older, the lower educated, those in bad health and those living in
igher unemployment regions are more likely to transition to disability
n the control group. Hence, for instance, local labour market conditions
ave an impact upon the transition to disability, but this impact does
ot seem to vary by treatment status (i.e. by being laid-off or not). 
.3. Mortality and the consumption of medication categories 
According to Table 4 , the mortality rate is 0.56% in the laid-off and
.34% in the control group within two years after the mass lay-off, hence
heir difference is 0.22% point, which increases to 0.36% point if we
ook at a horizon of four years. In line with these figures, a simple logit
odel, containing only the lay-off dummy gives an odds ratio of 1.64
ithin two years and 1.74 within four years. Thus, our results suggest
hat job loss indeed increases the risk of mortality. 
Using the additional medication data, Table 5 shows the rates of
eople in the treatment and the control group who are disabled and
lso consume various types of pharmaceuticals two and, respectively,
our years after the layoff, as well as the treatment – control differences.
e also present the results of simple logit models, containing only the
ay-off dummy as regressor. After two years, the rates are significantly
nd substantially larger (generally twice as large) in the treatment than
n the control group for most pharmaceutical categories. The only ex-eption is the group of antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents
L), where the estimated difference is essentially zero. Compared to the
ontrol level, the consumption probability and odds in the treatment
roup is particularly large (around 2.5-fold) for drugs of the cardiovas-
ular system (C), including lipid-modifying agents and antihypertensive
edications. The estimates are qualitatively similar after four years, al-
hough statistically significant in fewer cases and the relative estimated
ffects (logit odds ratios) are smaller. These results suggest that beyond
hysical health shocks as evidenced by the larger mortality rate, both
he diagnosis of chronic physical conditions (e.g. hypertension, high
holesterol level, diabetes) and mental health problems (measured by
he consumption of antidepressants) contribute to the higher uptake of
isability insurance among the laid-off. Note, however, that the find-
ngs should be interpreted with some precaution because the treatment
nd the control group are only balanced with respect to lagged overall
harmaceutical expenditure and not to lagged expenditure on specific
harmaceutical categories, which is available only for 2009–2011. 
.4. Health expenditure 
To gain insight into the time pattern of health expenditure around
isability benefit uptake among individuals who become disabled due
o a mass lay-off, Fig. 4 shows the estimated 𝜂k parameters of the event
tudy regressions of Eq. (1) . 
According to the figure, all three expenditure categories peak in the
ear when individuals first receive disability benefit. The absolute in-
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Fig. 5. Event study analysis of categories of pharmaceutical expenditure around the uptake of disability benefit Notes: Regression estimates of Eq. (1) are plotted. 
95% confidence intervals are displayed, based on cluster-robust standard errors (clustering on the individual level). DI: disability insurance. ATC group definitions: 
A – alimentary tract and metabolism; B – blood and blood forming organs; C – cardiovascular system; J – antiinfectives for systemic use; L – antineoplastic and 
immunomodulating agents; M – musculo-skeletal system; N – nervous system; R – respiratory system. Antidepressants (psychoanaleptics): N06; lipid modifying 
agents C10; antihypertensives: C02-C03 and C07-C09; antidiabetics: A10. 
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l  rease in spending is the largest on inpatient care, followed by spending
n drugs and then on outpatient care. Overall, inpatient expenditure
ncreases fivefold, and the other two categories around 2.5-fold in the
wo years before disability insurance enrolment. Similar patterns can
e observed for the probabilities of non-zero expenditure (the peak is
trongest for inpatient care with 33% points) and for the logarithms of
on-zero expenditure. After claiming the benefit, all categories of health
xpenditure start to decline but do not reach their pre-disability levels.
rom the peak, inpatient expenditure decreases the most, while phar-
aceutical expenditure the least. Altogether, the expenditure categories
emain 1 . 5 − 2 . 5 times higher in the medium term compared to two years
rior to claiming disability benefit. 
Fig. 4 reflects that health expenditure already starts to increase 1 − 2
ears before disability insurance enrolment. No matter if genuine health
hocks lead to disability claims or the propensity to claim disability
enefits drives healthcare use, the collection of medical evidence and
he application procedure itself require time, which explains this phe-
omenon. 
The descriptive plots presented in Fig. D3 in Appendix D are in line
ith the event study regression estimates. Irrespectively of how much
ime passed from the lay-off until the uptake of the disability benefit, the
ptake is associated with raised health expenditure, which declines after
laiming the benefit but does not fall back to its pre-disability levels. At
he same time, we do not observe a noteworthy pattern among the con-
rol pairs of the laid-off people who become later disabled; or among theaid-off but not disabled individuals. Fig. B2 in Appendix B also shows
hat mass lay-off in general (including non-disabled laid-off individuals)
as only a small (negative) effect on health spending. 
Finally, Fig. 5 shows the event study estimates for eight 1st level ATC
ategories and four widely used medication groups. Roughly in line with
he results of Table 5 , the categories on which expenditure significantly
ncreases 1 − 2 years before disability benefit uptake and remains ele-
ated afterwards are drugs acting on the cardiovascular system (C) (in
articular lipid modifying agents and antihypertensives), on the nervous
ystem (N) (in particular antidepressants) and on alimentary tract and
etabolism (A) (that include antidiabetics). Changes in the other cate-
ories are not significant. Although this event study analysis does not
llow the identification of the causal relationship between particular
llnesses and disability benefit uptake, it still provides insight into the
echanisms that increase health spending around the time of claiming
he benefit. Overall, it is not possible to identify a narrow category of
onditions that cause the surge in health expenditure, but the diagno-
is of chronic physical conditions, deterioration in mental health and
hysical health shocks might all be potential driving factors. 
. Discussion and conclusions 
Using individual-level administrative panel data from Hungary, we
nalysed the effect of job loss on disability benefit uptake and its re-
ationship with health expenditure, particularly with expenditure on
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 ifferent medication categories. To establish the causal effects of job
oss, we made use of mass lay-offs, and matched laid-off individuals to
on-laid-off workers with similar employment and health history. We
hen examined the uptake of disability benefit and health expenditure
n the matched sample. 
According to our results, job loss implies a 50 − 100 % increase in the
ransition to disability insurance in 2–4 years. The large and statistically
ignificant effects are in line with the conclusions of related studies from
orway (in between the effects estimated by Bratsberg et al., 2013 and
ege et al., 2009 ). To our knowledge, our study is the first that explicitly
nalyses the time-varying patterns of the transition rates. We obtain that
round half of the excess transitions to disability occur within the first
ear, and transition rates become very similar in the laid-off and control
roups after three years. 
In line with previous evidence in the literature ( Browning and Heine-
en, 2012; Eliason and Storrie, 2009; Sullivan and Wachter, 2009 ), we
nd that job loss significantly increases the risk of mortality on the four-
ear horizon. In addition, we provide evidence that the uptake of dis-
bility benefit after a job loss is associated with a surge in health ex-
enditure. Compared to two years prior to claiming disability benefit,
omponents of health expenditure increase 2 . 5 − 5 times, and start to
ecline afterwards but remain elevated in the medium term (at 1 . 5 − 2 . 5
imes the original values). Altogether, the additional health expenditure
s a share of annual disability payments reaches 40% in the first year
f disability and 20 − 25% in the medium term. 12 Although we cannot
laim that the additional healthcare expenditure is caused by the uptake
f disability benefit after a job loss, our results still suggest that reducing
he employment-related channels of disability claim would have bene-
cial effects on the public healthcare budget. 
In principle, worsening health status, the diagnosis of previously un-
etected chronic diseases, or unnecessary healthcare visits in order to
heat the disability system, may all lead to the expenditure increase.
dditional medication data indicates that several categories of phar-
aceutical expenditure increase around the uptake of disability ben-
fits, hence the diagnosis of chronic physical conditions such as hy-
ertension and diabetes, the deterioration in mental health, and phys-
cal health shocks might all contribute to the observed surge in health
xpenditure. 12 Compared to two years prior to claiming disability benefit, health expen- 
iture is higher by 370 thousand HUF in the first year of disability insurance 
nrolment and by 220 thousand HUF two years later. Meanwhile, the average 
nnual disability benefit was 920 thousand HUF in the laid-off, disabled sample. 
P  
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Fig. A1. Histograms of the propensity scoresBased on our results, we conclude that the rise in disability benefit
ptake after a job loss is not purely a moral hazard issue. Besides the
vidence for genuine health shocks, we also find that the effect of job
oss on disability insurance utilisation is stronger among those in worse
ealth. Individuals in poor health might continue working if they are
ot laid off to maintain their income level, however, once laid-off, they
re more likely to apply for disability benefits. 
Overall, our results indicate large causal effects of job loss on dis-
bility insurance use, which are, in turn, associated with substantial in-
reases in health expenditure. Out of 100 laid-off workers, roughly 1.4
laim disability benefit due to the job loss within four years of the lay-off.
ompared to the pre-lay-off health expenditure levels, these individuals
ore than triple their annual health expenditure. These findings point to
he importance of ensuring employment possibilities to workers affected
y mass lay-offs. Otherwise, disability benefits serve as a substitute for
mployment which increases public expenditure not only due to benefit
ayments, but also due to the higher public health expenditure of the
enefit claimants. 
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ppendix A. Propensity score matching, balance plot  (linear predictions after logit model). 
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Fig. B2. Effect of job loss on health expenditure among the laid-off, laid-off and later disabled, laid-off and later not disabled workers and their matched control 
groups, with 95% confidence intervals. The probability of positive expenditure and the logarithm of positive expenditure are displayed. 
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e  ppendix B. Effect of mass lay-off on labour market indicators 
nd health expenditure 
Table B1 shows the effect of job loss on labour market indicators
fter two and four years, while Fig. B2 displays the effect on health
xpenditure in general (i.e. not focusing on the later disabled group).
he estimates show the difference between the treatment (laid-off) and
atched control (non-laid-off) groups. When constructing the second
nd third rows of Fig. B2 , we repeated the matching algorithm described
n Section 4.1 separately on the subsample of workers who received dis-
bility benefits any time after the mass lay-off and also on the subsample
f workers whom we do not observe receiving disability benefits after
he mass lay-off. 
According to the first row of Fig. B2 , after the mass lay-off, the prob-
bilities of positive outpatient and positive pharmaceutical expenditure
ecrease slightly in the laid-off compared to the control group. The third
ow shows that this small negative effect is driven by the large group of
aid off workers who did not become disabled afterwards. In contrast,
n the second row, we see major upward jumps in all measures of health
xpenditure among the later disabled (in line with Fig. D3 ). As discussed
n Section 5.2 ( Fig. 3 ), the uptake of disability benefits increases already
ithin the first year after the mass lay-off. This is reflected by the in-
reasing health spending soon after lay-off within the group of disabil-
ty recipients. Appendix D provides further details on the dynamics of
ealth spending of the disability recipients. ppendix C. Alternative definitions of job loss 
We check the robustness of the main results to the definition of job
oss. First, we define mass lay-off more liberally, i.e. if the firm size
ecreases by at least 20% in a given month (instead of the 30% used
n the baseline specification), it remains below 80% (instead of 70%)
f the original size in the following year, and no more than 10% (the
alf of 20%, instead of the half of 30%) of the employees move to the
ame employer. Second, we use a more conservative definition: the firm
ize decreases by at least 40% in a given month, it remains below 60%
f the original size in the following year, and no more than 20% of the
mployees move to the same employer. 
The next alternative measure is company closure, including early
eavers. We treat a firm as a closing firm if it existed in the past 12
onths, but not afterwards, and no more than 15% of its employees
oved on to the same employer after the closure. We follow individ-
als who left the company at most 12 months before the closure. This
ight include some voluntary leavers as well, who are likely to transit
o another job, not to unemployment or disability insurance. 
The final measure is based on the Hungarian legal definition of col-
ective redundancy. It occurs when an employer makes at least 10 em-
loyees redundant from a firm with 20 − 99 employees; or makes at least
0% of the employees redundant from a firm with 100 − 299 employees;
r makes at least 30 employees redundant from a firm with at least 300
mployees. Again, we exclude firms from which more than 15% of the
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Table B1 
Effect of job loss on earnings and labour force status. 
Log monthly earnings 
at 2 years at 4 years 
in (matched) control group 11.6306 11.6279 
in (matched) laid-off group 11.5729 11.5418 
difference (with SE) −0 . 0577 ∗∗∗ (0.0087) −0 . 0861 ∗∗∗ (0.0129) 
Number of observations 39,808 17,944 
Employment probabilities 
at 2 years at 4 years 
in (matched) control group 0.8386 0.7640 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.6580 0.6570 
difference (with SE) −0 . 1806 ∗∗∗ (0.0037) −0 . 1370 ∗∗∗ (0.0056) 
Number of observations 53,201 25,846 
Unemployment probabilities 
at 2 years at 4 years 
in (matched) control group 0.0650 0.0755 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.1228 0.1174 
difference (with SE) 0.0578 ∗∗∗ (0.0025) 0.0419 ∗∗∗ (0.0036) 
Number of observations 53,201 25,846 
Probability of receipt of maternity benefits (females) 
at 2 years at 4 years 
in (matched) control group 0.0132 0.0116 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0154 0.0130 
difference (with SE) 0.0022 (0.0015) 0.0014 (0.0020) 
Number of observations 24,825 11,930 
With cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), clustering at the level of matched pairs. 
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Table C2 
Probabilities of disability insurance enrolment, other definitions of job loss. 
Disability insurance probabilities 
at 2 years at 4 years 
after mass lay-off, 30% cut-off (baseline) 
in (matched) control group 0.0121 0.0290 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0236 0.0426 
difference (with S.E.) 0.0114 ∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0136 ∗∗∗ (0.0023) 
Number of observations 53,114 25,760 
after mass lay-off, 20% cut-off
in (matched) control group 0.0129 0.0267 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0250 0.0463 
difference (with SE) 0.0121 ∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0196 ∗∗∗ (0.0023) 
Number of observations 55,119 26,144 
after mass lay-off, 40% cut-off
in (matched) control group 0.0104 0.0247 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0225 0.0422 
difference (with SE) 0.0121 ∗∗∗ (0.0014) 0.0175 ∗∗∗ (0.0029) 
Number of observations 33,391 15,088 
after firm closure and early leavers 
in (matched) control group 0.0124 0.0275 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0190 0.0375 
difference (with SE) 0.0066 ∗∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0099 ∗∗∗ (0.0023) 
Number of observations 51,640 32,413 
after collective redundancy 
in (matched) control group 0.0096 0.0200 
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0212 0.0249 
difference (with SE) 0.0116 ∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0049 ∗∗∗ (0.0005) 
Number of observations 204,250 100,473 
With cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), clustering at the level of matched 
pairs. 
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
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s  mployees move on to the same employer after the redundancy. Since
he reason of leaving a job cannot be observed in our data, we can-
ot distinguish between redundancy and voluntary separation. Among
arger firms, the legal definition classifies even a separation rate below0% as a collective redundancy. Therefore, due to data limitations, it is
ikely that some voluntary separations are included in this definition of
ay-off. This is less of an issue under our baseline specification (at least
0% downsizing), since voluntary separation is less likely if the size of
 firm decreases by at least 30%. 
Table C2 compares the probabilities of receiving disability benefit
n the alternative laid-off groups to their control groups chosen with
ropensity score matching (as explained in Section 4.1 ). The upper pan-
ls of the table indicate that changing the cut-off point of mass lay-off
as little impact on the estimated effect of mass lay-off on disability
enefit uptake. 
Looking at firm closures and collective redundancies, the estimated
ffect of “lay-off” on disability benefit uptake is smaller than in the base-
ine specification (for collective redundancies, only at four years), albeit
till significantly positive. The smaller estimated effect is likely due to
he inclusion of voluntary early leavers in the firm closure and the collec-
ive redundancy samples. To illustrate this, we compared the pre-layoff
one year earlier) annual health expenditure of individuals leaving a
rm due to mass lay-off and due to firm closure. Examining the gender-
nd age-corrected percentiles, we see that those leaving a firm due to
ass lay-off have, on average, 1–2 percentage points higher outpatient,
npatient and pharmaceutical expenditure (all three differences being
tatistically significant). This supports that individuals included in the
rm closure sample are on average of better health, hence are more
ikely to transition voluntarily to another job, instead of applying for
isability (or other) benefits. 
ppendix D. Health expenditure around the uptake of disability 
enefit 
Fig. D3 displays the health expenditure patterns of laid-off, disabled
ndividuals, split into four subgroups according to the timing of the dis-
bility benefit uptake. Albeit the event study regressions net out cal-
ndar year and individual fixed effects, the descriptive plots still show
imilar time patterns as the event study estimates reported in Fig. 4 . The
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Fig. D3. Health expenditure of the laid-off, disabled workers by the time gap between the uptake of disability benefit and mass lay-off, in the matched control group 
and in the laid-off but not disabled sample, with 95% confidence intervals. The probability of positive expenditure and the logarithm of positive expenditure are 
displayed. 
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 ptake of disability benefit is associated with raised health expenditure,
hich declines after claiming the benefit but does not fall back to its
re-disability levels. 
We do not observe a noteworthy pattern among the matched control
bservations, i.e. among the matched non-laid-off pairs of the laid-off
nd eventually disabled individuals. Initially, we had four different con-
rol groups for the four different disabled samples according to the time
pent between mass lay-off and disability benefit uptake, but the health
xpenditures of the four control groups do not differ significantly, hence
e display only their average values in Fig. D3 . 
Similarly, there is no jump in the health expenditure of the laid-off
ut not disabled individuals. The lines for the latter group are consis-
ently below those for the other groups, since the later disabled laid-off
orkers are in worse health (as captured by health spending) even be-
ore the lay-off. This is in line with the results of Table 3 , showing that
he impact of job loss on disability benefit uptake is stronger among
hose who were in worse health even before the job loss. Importantly,
ur matching algorithm takes into account such differences in health
xpenditure before job loss – as the dashed line on Fig. D3 indicates, the
ealth expenditure of the laid-off disabled and their matched control
non-laid-off) pairs is similar. 
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